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Swine CAFOs &
Novel H1N1 Flu   
Separating Facts from Fears
W
ith cases documented in more 
than 170 countries, the global 
swine flu pandemic that erupted in 
spring 2009 remains a serious public 
health problem. Caused by a strain of 
H1N1 influenza virus, which is nor-
mally found in pigs, the flu now known 
as novel H1N1 has so far been less severe 
than regular seasonal flu in terms of 
deaths and hospitalizations. Yet given 
its remarkable capacity for human-to-
human transmission and a widespread 
lack of immunity among potentially 
exposed people, it’s likely the number Focus  | Swine CAFOs and Novel H1N1 Flu
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A hog farm in Auxvasse, Missouri, 30 April 2009
of cases will rise during the flu season 
later this fall and winter, according 
to many public health experts. Given 
that possibility, enormous resources 
are being mobilized to address novel 
H1N1, with an emphasis on vaccine 
development, education, and efforts to 
its limit its movements among human 
communities.  
Yet one potential source of the origi-
nal outbreak—factory swine farming in 
concentrated animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs)—has received comparatively 
little attention by public health officials. 
CAFOs house animals by the thousands 
in crowded indoor facilities. But the same 
economy-of-scale efficiencies that allow 
CAFOs to produce affordable meat for so 
many consumers also facilitate the muta-
tion of viral pathogens into novel strains 
that can be passed on to farm workers 
and veterinarians, according to Gregory 
Gray, director of the Center for Emerg-
ing Infectious Diseases at the University 
of Iowa College of Public Health. 
“When respiratory viruses get into 
these confinement facilities, they have 
continual opportunity to replicate, 
mutate, reassort, and recombine into 
novel strains,” Gray explains. “The best 
surrogates we can find in the human 
population are prisons, military bases, 
ships, or schools. But respiratory viruses 
can run quickly through these [human]Focus | Swine CAFOs and Novel H1N1 Flu
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populations and then burn out, whereas in 
CAFOs—which often have continual intro-
ductions of [unexposed] animals—there’s 
a much greater potential for the viruses to 
spread and become endemic.” 
Gray says workers exposed routinely to 
livestock can pass these zoonotic infections—
which transmit readily among humans and 
animals—on to the wider public. However, 
public health agencies that monitor risks 
from zoonotic infections routinely overlook 
CAFO workers, according to Ellen Sil-
bergeld, a professor at the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health. And 
animal disease sampling data collected by 
the food animal industry typically are not 
shared publicly, according to Gray, although 
such data could reveal how novel pathogens 
evolve in CAFOs and how they might move 
among animals, workers, and the broader 
community. Experts believe that without 
these data, society has a diminished capac-
ity to detect and respond to new zoonotic 
threats before they become more widespread. 
An Historical View of Flu
The H1N1 virus first emerged around the 
time of the pandemic of “Spanish flu,” 
which infected one-third of the world’s 
population and killed up to 100 million 
people between 1918 and 1920. During 
the later stages of that pandemic, farm-
ers noticed that pigs also were getting sick 
with the malady scientists at the time called 
“hog flu.” Hog flu was reported intermit-
tently in the Midwestern United States long 
after the human pandemic ended. In 1930, 
Richard E. Shope, while working at The 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 
identified the cause of the animal illness: 
the influenza virus now known as H1N1, 
named in reference to its hemagglutinin (H) 
and neuraminidase (N) surface proteins. 
Jürgen A. Richt, a distinguished profes-
sor at Kansas State University College of Vet-
erinary Medicine, and other experts believe 
that after 1918, H1N1 established itself in 
pigs, which unlike monkeys, mice, or ferrets, 
can survive the infection. Scientists can’t 
conclusively say if humans first infected pigs 
with the H1N1 virus or vice versa, Richt 
says. But what is clear, he adds, is that pigs 
have been a reservoir for the virus ever since.
As a group, H1N1 viruses are common 
in pigs, which typically experience minor flu 
symptoms when infected. Studies published 
by Canadian experts, such as a report by 
Zvonimir Poljak et al. in the January 2008 
issue of the Canadian Journal of Veterinary 
Research, indicate that swine flu is more like-
ly to be present and to persist in larger farms 
with higher pig densities. This suggests the 
CAFO environment may be more likely than 
smaller farms to facilitate the evolution of 
novel strains.  
CAFO workers can also pick up H1N1 
infections and experience a range of symp-
toms depending on their own immunity, says 
Gray. In humans, what makes novel H1N1 
unique is its remarkable and still mysterious 
capacity for person-to-person transmission. 
“The strain has a unique presentation of anti-
gens [surface proteins that evoke immune 
response],” Gray says. “Most people have 
never been exposed to anything like it before. 
We’re still not sure why it transmits so readily 
from one person to another; this is the subject 
of a lot of research.” 
Novel H1N1 contains genes from North 
American and Eurasian swine influenza 
viruses, explains Carolyn Bridges, associ-
ate director for epidemiologic science in the 
Influenza Division of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC). These 2 
viral strains could have mixed in either pigs 
or humans, Bridges suggests, or less likely 
in other animals such as wild birds. Gray 
says the strain could even have been created 
inadvertently by scientists engaged in recom-
binant viral research with H1N1. But it’s also 
biologically plausible, he adds, that the virus 
could have evolved in a CAFO somewhere in 
the world.   
One thing that’s certain is that no one 
can say exactly where the pandemic strain 
evolved, says Silbergeld. Moreover, its origins 
can’t be determined retrospectively, given 
how fast influenzas mutate as they pass from 
host to host. 
In the absence of publicly available sam-
pling data, speculation about the origins of 
the current pandemic have run rampant. In 
April 2009, bloggers including Tom Philpott, 
writing for the environmental website Grist, 
and David Kirby, for the Huffington Post, 
created a stir when they pointed a finger at 
Mexican CAFOs run by Smithfield Foods 
subsidiary Granjas Carroll de México. Each 
year these CAFOs raise some 950,000 hogs 
on 16 farms along the border of the Mexican 
states of Veracruz and Puebla. One such 
CAFO lies about 5 miles outside the town of 
Perote, home to the pandemic’s first reported 
case. Philpott cited as evidence newspaper 
interviews with Perote residents, who claimed 
infectious pollution from the CAFO had 
sickened the 5-year-old victim, a boy who 
later recovered. Those claims were never sci-
entifically confirmed, however, and Mexican 
officials later identified another case from a 
different part of the country who could have 
been infected as early as February. 
Novel H1N1 Raises the Stakes
The novel H1N1 episode comes on the 
heels of a protracted backlash against the 
The waste lagoon for 
a CAFO near Perote, 
Mexico, 1 May 2009
According to early media reports, residents of Perote believe waste from nearby swine 
CAFOs run by Granjas Carroll de México was the source of the novel H1N1 that infected a 
local child, the first reported case in the pandemic. Earlier cases have since been identified 
elsewhere, and it is impossible to say now where or how the pandemic began.
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CAFO industry, which has been blamed 
by critics for a host of environmental ills. 
Swine CAFOs generate vast amounts of 
fecal waste, stored in onsite lagoons that 
can breach and pollute local watersheds 
during heavy rains. The facilities emit a 
piercing odor that can be detected up to 
6 miles from its source if not managed 
properly. 
Steven Wing, an associate professor of 
epidemiology at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, reported in the 
March 2000 issue of EHP that CAFO odors 
can evoke emotional distress and headaches 
among local residents. “The biggest differ-
ences between CAFO-exposed communities 
and matched controls are found in quality-
of-life measures,” he says of his findings. 
“These are indicated by how often local resi-
dents report that they can’t open windows 
or go outside even in nice weather.” 
According to Wing, the ammonia-laden 
airborne emissions released by CAFOs are 
also linked to asthma, mucous membrane 
irritation, and other respiratory sysmptoms. 
The facilities have further been implicated in 
the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. 
In the face of harsh criticism, the indus-
try claims its practices are unfairly maligned. 
“The story our critics seldom tell is that 
all our farms are permitted by states or the 
federal government and subject to regular 
inspections,” says Dennis Treacy, Smithfield 
Foods’ vice president of environmental and 
corporate affairs. “We also require that all 
our farms go through stringent environmen-
tal management programs on top of permit 
requirements.”
But a closer look reveals that CAFOs fall 
through regulatory cracks when it comes to 
sampling for novel viruses that could make 
people sick. Bridges explains that producers 
have little incentive to test for swine influ-
enzas, in part because they aren’t included 
on a list of 150 “reportable illnesses” that, 
when detected, must be documented with 
the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE). Based in Paris, the OIE is the vet-
erinary disease counterpart to the World 
Health Organization. 
Kay Johnson Smith, executive vice pres-
ident with the Animal Agriculture Alli-
ance, an industry-funded educational group, 
points out the OIE doesn’t consider swine 
influenzas reportable because it views them 
as routine infections in animal agriculture. 
“H1N1 is a standard swine flu,” she says, 
“and therefore, like other flus such as stan-
dard avian or equine flu, they aren’t report-
able as emerging diseases.” 
Novel H1N1 also is not required to be 
reported to OIE, although in a 21 July 2009 
editorial posted on the organization’s website, 
director general Bernard Vallat “strongly 
advises” members to report animal cases 
of the disease. As of 29 July 2009, only 4 
swine herds had been shown to be infected 
with novel H1N1: 1 in Alberta, Canada; 1 
in Québec, Canada; and 2 in Argentina’s 
Buenos Aires Province. But public health 
experts have been unable to look for the 
new strain in large-scale industrial farms in 
part because the pork industry won’t allow 
them to, according to Gray. He says pork 
producers could face global trade sanctions 
and economic losses should the strain be 
revealed in its animals. The Alberta herd was 
in fact destroyed without compensation to its 
owner when the infection was discovered. 
“There’s considerable aversion among 
swine producers to even test for the pan-
demic strain,” Gray claims. “They worry 
they’d have to destroy their animals and 
lose that income.” Moreover, countries that 
report food animal diseases to the OIE can 
suffer trade sanctions to protect importers 
from foreign infections. 
As far as international surveillance goes, 
Vallat wrote in his 21 July 2009 editorial 
that “OIE has called upon the expertise 
from [collaborating laboratories and research 
centers] to publicly share genetic sequences 
of influenza identified in swine in full trans-
parency, to facilitate the early preparation of 
human and animal vaccines if needed. The 
OIE will continue to draw the attention 
of its Members and of the public at large 
that all potential zoonotic diseases must be 
controlled by strengthening the Veterinary 
Services in order to improve the early detec-
tion, rapid response, surveillance and report-
ing capabilities of animal diseases including 
zoonoses in all countries, regardless of their 
level of development and trade potential.”
In May 2009, the U.S. Department 
of  Agriculture  (USDA)  announced  a 
$1.5 million surveillance program to look 
for novel flu strains in pigs. But according 
to USDA spokeswoman Angela Harless, this 
program, which was funded by the CDC in 
September of 2008, will sample only sick 
pigs submitted voluntarily by swine growers 
to government and private labs, in addition 
to herds exposed to the novel H1N1 strain 
by sick CAFO workers. 
“USDA continues to encourage swine 
growers to report sick pigs to their herd 
veterinarian, state animal health official, or 
area vet in charge,” she says. “If swine herds 
test positive for novel H1N1, they will be 
closely monitored and allowed to move in 
commerce once they have recovered.”
But Richt asserts that without more 
industry  cooperation,  the  USDA’s 
surveillance program is “dead in the water.” 
In other words, he explains, producers won’t 
An employee at a CAFO 
run by Granjas Carroll 
de México, 1 May 2009
It takes only a few workers to run a facility housing thousands of animals. Automated 
systems deliver food and water at regular intervals, and waste is flushed periodically. 
Workers monitor the automated equipment and check the animals for any health or 
behavior problems. 
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A duck or other
aquatic bird passes a bird
strain of influenza A to
an intermediate host
such as a chicken or pig.
Without
undergoing
genetic change,
a bird strain of
influenza A can
jump directly
from a duck
or other aquatic
bird to
humans.
The new strain
may further
evolve to spread
from person to  
person. If so, a
flu pandemic
could arise.
The genetic change that enables a flu strain to jump from one animal
species to another, including humans, is called “ANTIGENIC SHIFT.”
Antigenic shift can happen in three ways:
Bird host
HA
antigen
  NA
antigen Human
host
Human influenza A strain
HA
antigen
  NA
antigen
Without 
undergoing 
genetic change,
a bird strain of
influenza A
can jump
directly from a
duck or other
aquatic bird to
an intermediate 
animal host and
then to humans.
The new strain
can spread
from the
intermediate
host to 
humans.
A person passes a
human strain of
influenza A to the
same chicken or pig. (Note that reassortment can
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How Novel Influenza Strains Evolve            
submit their animals for analysis without 
a guarantee of indemnification, meaning 
economic protection to recover losses should 
the virus be discovered. 
CAFO Employees: A Crucial Link
Gray says he welcomes the new USDA sur-
veillance program, but he worries that it 
lacks a crucial element: The protocol doesn’t 
include CAFO workers, who can infect 
pigs with influenza and also be infected 
by them. When zoonotic flu viruses jump 
from species to species, they can pick up 
new mutations and reassort into novel 
strains that might be unrecognizable to 
both animal and human immune systems, 
Gray explains. “If we want to detect novel 
viruses from the human–animal interface, 
then we also need to study the workers,” he 
emphasizes.
The agency charged with ensuring 
worker safety is the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA). How-
ever, OSHA typically exempts facilities 
with fewer than 11 employees from routine 
inspection unless otherwise requested by 
employees or other agencies. Yet, like many 
other modern production facilities, CAFOs 
are largely automated, so a typical factory 
farm housing 2,000 sows requires a crew 
of just 7 people, according to Don Butler, 
director of government relations and public 
affairs for Murphy-Brown, the livestock pro-
duction subsidiary of Smithfield Foods. And 
Wing adds that CAFOs in some regions are 
often staffed by black and Hispanic workers 
who might fear racial harassment for report-
ing safety infractions to OSHA, as well as 
low-income workers of all races who worry 
about keeping their jobs in the industry and 
access to health care, housing, and other ser-
vices provided by their employers.
When asked how OSHA regulates 
zoonotic disease risk at CAFOs, a spokes-
man at the agency said its purview applies 
exclusively to bloodborne pathogens via the 
Bloodborne Pathogens Standard (29 CFR 
1910.1030), which excludes respiratory 
infections such as swine flu. OSHA consid-
ers the risk of zoonotic disease only in terms 
of health care workers involved in respond-
ing to a pandemic. But the spokesman could 
not confirm whether a CAFO had ever been 
cited for violation of the Bloodborne Patho-
gens Standard. “The information on inspec-
tions in our database is not detailed enough 
to make this determination,” he says. 
To develop its CAFO inspection strate-
gies, OSHA draws on research generated 
by the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH). According to 
public health officer Frank Hearl, NIOSH’s 
CAFO research activities are proceeding 
on 2 fronts, one addressing noise exposure 
(a common occupational hazard for swine 
farmers) and another quantifying airborne 
microbial levels at CAFOs. This latter activ-
ity, Hearl says, is managed by an extra-
mural grant awarded to Norman Pace, a 
distinguished professor in the Department 
of Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental 
Biology at the University of Colorado, Boul-
der. When asked about his research, Pace 
said it doesn’t deal with zoonotic illnesses. A 
possible exception, he says, is Johne disease, 
a wasting affliction in cattle that is suspect-
ed by some to be a cause of human Crohn 
disease. That proposed link has never been 
scientifically proven. 
Speaking for the private sector, Mary 
Battrell, a veterinarian with Murphy-Brown, 
says the company has no formal flu surveil-
lance plan for its workers, although it does 
require that they get a flu shot every year. 
Gray and Silbergeld believe CAFO 
workers and veterinarians should be seen as 
high-priority groups for influenza surveil-
lance and vaccination. These groups, Gray 
says, experience the biggest risk factor for 
zoonotic infection through their routine and 
intensive exposure to food animals. They 
also serve as “bridge populations” that can 
transfer these infections from animals to the 
wider public, he says. 
In the 30 May 2007 issue of Vaccine, 
Gray and colleagues estimated the current 
U.S. swine and poultry CAFO workforce 
at about 54,000 workers—the number is 
difficult to gauge, they explained, because 
these workers have no unifying membership 
organization. “Considering other high-risk 
groups in the U.S. national plans targeted 
for special access to pandemic vaccines and 
antivirals (e.g., 8–9 million U.S. medical 
and public health workers), the number of 
swine and poultry workers is relatively few,” 
the authors wrote. “Hence, the investment 
in protecting them is relatively small and 
very likely cost-effective.”
Building on a growing body of evi-
dence, Gray’s research strongly suggests 
that CAFO workers and veterinarians can 
infect other people with H1N1 viruses. 
In a 2-year prospective study of 803 rural 
Iowans, published in Emerging Infectious 
Diseases in December 2007 , he found that 
CAFO workers were 50 times more like-
ly to have elevated H1N1 antibodies than 
nonexposed controls. Equally important, 
their spouses were 25 times more likely to 
harbor these antibodies, reflecting how 
the viruses can jump from farm workers to 
their intimate contacts. Similarly, in work 
published 15 May 2009 in the Journal of 
the American Veterinary Medical Associa-
tion, Gray and coauthor Whitney S. Baker 
reported that 84% of 44 seroepidemiologic 
studies reviewed identified an increased 
risk of zoonotic pathogen infection among 
veterinarians. 
Beyond surveying workers directly, Gray 
adds, academic researchers should also sam-
ple CAFO environments. “We need to look 
for viruses in the air, swab surfaces, and 
follow the pigs and workers and figure out 
how the viruses jump species,” he says. “It’s 
important to find out how these viruses 
move and persist in CAFO environments 
from one pig cohort to the next. If we find 
a high prevalence of viral infection with a 
given strain in January, why do we see it 
again the next January if the pigs live only 
six months before slaughter? We need to 
study the pigs, the workers, and the envi-
ronment to understand how the viruses get 
around, and what sort of interventions we 
can take to limit transmission.” Silbergeld 
recently submitted a grant proposal to the 
NIEHS to further study zoonotic pathogens 
including their persistence in CAFO envi-
ronments and nearby communities.
Relying on Biosecurity
A crucial question is whether other, poten-
tially more lethal influenzas could emerge 
from CAFOs, assuming these facilities 
allow new strains to evolve with unprec-
edented speed and efficiency. According 
to Andrew Pekosz, an associate professor 
of microbiology and immunology at the 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Pub-
lic Health, newly virulent strains emerge 
randomly, by chance. By concentrating 
so many viruses in one place, he explains, 
CAFOs increase the frequency at which 
more dangerous strains might appear. 
“This is all a numbers game,” he says. “The 
more variants you’re exposed to, the more 
likely it is that you’ll be exposed to one 
with altered properties that allows for infec-
tion of a new host.” 
Given that threat, the industry relies on 
biosecurity measures to prevent pathogens 
from getting into or out of CAFOs. John-
son Smith says biosecurity protocols are 
company-specific and can vary by facility. 
In general, she says, CAFOs require employ-
ees to shower before they enter and leave the 
workplace, and to wear protective clothing 
that covers their hair, shoes, and clothes. 
“Only authorized personnel are allowed to 
enter the animal facilities, and authoriza-
tion is required for anyone else,” she says. 
“Some people say we have something to 
hide, but these security measures protect 
animal health and safety, as well as food 
safety. They are in place to help prevent the 
spread of disease from humans to animals.” 
Butler says that in addition to these mea-
sures, the company requires employees to 
avoid a CAFO for at least 4 days if they’ve 
been out of the country to avoid introducing 
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exotic diseases. “And our farms are located 
in rural areas, which tend to be sparsely 
populated with wide-open spaces,” he adds. 
“They’re not immediately adjacent to residen-
tial areas.” 
But in practice, CAFO workers don’t 
always wear the recommended protective 
gear, according to multiple scientists who 
have studied such facilities. In addition, Wing 
counters there are other routes by which 
pathogens could get into or out of CAFOs 
regardless of these biosecurity protocols. For 
instance, hog waste stored in onsite lagoons 
can spill into streams or penetrate into 
groundwater, he says. Untreated hog wastes 
are also routinely sprayed on crop fields as fer-
tilizer. And, although not a standard industry 
practice, anecdotal evidence suggests hog car-
casses are sometimes loaded into dumpsters, 
raising the possibility that vectors could carry 
hog pathogens to surrounding environs. 
The degree to which hog waste might 
be pathogenic is unknown. Echoing conclu-
sions reached by others, Wing says there’s no 
evidence to suggest that communities living 
near CAFOs have elevated rates of infec-
tious illness. Kelley Donham, a professor 
of occupational and environmental health 
at the University of Iowa College of Public 
Health, adds that influenza in particular 
doesn’t survive well in the environment. 
“It’s a respiratory virus,” he says. “It’s always 
looking for respiratory epithelial cells, so 
it doesn’t seem plausible to suggest that it 
could be transmitted through waste.” 
Still, Donham says other zoonotic patho-
gens in hog waste—particularly bacterial 
agents including Salmonella, Leptospira, and 
some infectious strains of Escherichia coli—
could travel downwind as spray aerosols and 
theoretically infect local populations. 
Moreover, he says, air- and waterborne 
CAFO emissions are often contaminated 
with antibiotic-resistant microbes such as 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA). In an article published 23 January 
2009 in PLoS ONE, Tara C. Smith of the 
University of Iowa College of Public Health 
and colleagues reported finding pig-specific 
MRSA strains among farmworkers and swine 
in Iowa and Illinois. Antibiotic uses in agri-
culture exceed human clinical use by roughly 
eightfold, Silbergeld says, such that industrial-
scale farms compete with hospitals as a major 
source of the antibiotic resistance that plagues 
medical care today [for more information, see 
“The Landscape of Antibiotic Resistance,” 
EHP 117:A244–A250 (2009)].
Conflict of Interest? 
Meanwhile, Robert Martin, senior offi-
cer with the Pew Environment Group in 
Washington, DC, is concerned that com-
peting financial interests may be partly to 
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)—the veterinary medicine counterpart 
to the World Health Organization—does not require but “strongly advises” farmers to 
report cases of novel H1N1 detected in livestock and to intensify their surveillance for 
potential infections. In a 21 July 2009 editorial, OIE director general Bernard Vallat wrote, 
“The creation of a vaccine directed against this virus in pigs could be one of the solutions 
to control the disease in animals if the number of infected herds becomes excessive, 
because of the potentially growing number of animals infected by humans in the context 
of the human pandemic.”
A Chinese piglet is 
vaccinated soon after 
birth, 30 April 2009
A Chinese farmer 
sprays disinfectant 
on pigs, 29 April 2009
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blame for the current lack of data and regu-
lation. “Even the best scientists seem loathe 
to say anything against the industry,” he 
says. “With the decline in public research 
funding, it’s industrial animal agriculture 
that pays for virtually all the animal sci-
ences research going on at land-grant uni-
versities today.” 
Martin directed the Pew Commission 
on Industrial Farm Animal Production, 
which released its final report, Putting Meat 
on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Pro-
duction in America, in April 2008. In pre-
paring that report, he says, “We looked at 
that close relationship, and it seemed to us 
that the research is biased to generate more 
industry profit. Many academic research-
ers are concerned about alienating their 
primary source of research dollars—i.e., the 
industrial animal sector—and that makes 
them leery of looking at industry problems 
with an open mind.”
“We agree there should be more pub-
lic funding, but since our government and 
Congress are not allocating enough money 
for this purpose, someone has to pay to have 
research done,” retorts Johnson Smith. “Can 
we truly afford as a nation to not do research? 
Who else will pay for agricultural research 
besides those with a vested interest in advanc-
ing and improving current practices?”
These points lead to new questions: 
Who should decide how current practices 
are advanced and improved? And what con-
stitutes “advancement” and “improvement”? 
Answers to these questions devolve quickly 
into subjective and wildly divergent views 
about how food production should be man-
aged, yet this vastly complex topic defies 
simple solutions. 
Industry argues the trend toward CAFO-
dominated animal agriculture is safer than 
more traditional farming, wherein livestock 
spend much of their time outside, exposed 
to inclement weather and viruses from other 
animals, including wild birds. Among other 
preventive measures, says Johnson Smith, 
pork producers raise their stock in enclosed 
buildings with bird wire to prevent birds 
from entering the facility, and pig feed is 
stored in enclosed bins that prevent contami-
nation with bird droppings. 
In another example of how traditional 
farming comes with its own infectious 
disease risks, Smith says infection with 
Trichinella spiralis (the source of the danger-
ous foodborne human disease trichinosis) is 
much rarer in CAFO-raised swine than in 
pigs raised outdoors, which are more likely 
to eat a diet of swill and the occasional rat 
or wild animal carcass. “The real question,” 
Smith says, “is how much of a threat do 
these CAFO facilities really pose, and what 
are the tradeoffs we have to accept for hav-
ing affordable protein sources?” 
Yet CAFOs can be shocking to the senses 
and capable of evoking highly charged public 
reactions. These reactions routinely put the 
industry in a defensive posture as it attempts 
to sway opinion in its favor with communi-
cation strategies routinely dismissed by crit-
ics as spin. Extracting accurate information 
in this embattled context is challenging at 
best—or, some say, impossible. 
As with other complex topics, nearly 
every significant aspect of CAFO produc-
tion can be viewed from multiple perspec-
tives. But perhaps this much is clear: the 
current pandemic shows that viruses of ani-
mal origin can pose a substantial human 
health threat. And if CAFOs were to accel-
erate the evolution of these viruses, Gray 
says, then the public has a right to know 
how those viruses evolve and what steps 
can be taken to limit their spread. “If we 
find something new,” he says, “we need to 
heighten surveillance to track it—not sit on 
it and pretend nothing’s happening until the 
problem explodes.”
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